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The need for aid coordination has become a recurrent theme
in the discussions and strategic thinking of national and inter-
national aid agencies. The Paris Declaration (March 2005) and
the Accra Agenda for Action (September 2008) thus men-
tioned aid coordination as one of the key mechanisms to be
mobilized with a view to enhancing aid eﬀectiveness. The sig-
natories, indeed, made a commitment to eliminate duplication
of eﬀorts and rationalize donor activities so that they become
as cost-eﬀective as possible. The European Union (EU), in
particular, has enshrined the importance of aid coordination
with other donors in several policy documents: Consensus
on Development (2006), the Code of Conduct on Division
of Labour (2007), and the Operational Framework on Aid
Eﬀectiveness (2009) based on the international aid eﬀective-
ness agenda. Among the ambitious goals featured in these
documents are the following: a better alignment of donor pri-
orities with partner countries’ development strategy, the donor
harmonization of conditionalities, improved mutual account-
ability and transparence, management for results, the delega-
tion to a leading donor of the responsibility of managing aid
to a particular country, co-ﬁnancing arrangements, and even
joint programing and the pooling of aid resources destined
for recipient countries. 1
The gains of aid coordination from the standpoint of donor
countries can be usefully thought of as belonging to the cate-
gories of cost savings and governance beneﬁts. Cost saving
eﬀects are expected to result from a substantial reduction in
the individually borne transaction costs accompanying the
various steps involved in the aid delivery process: exploratory
missions, negotiations, delivery, monitoring, follow up, and
evaluation. As for the governance eﬀects, they are caused by
a more eﬀective implementation of conditionalities and better
monitoring of aid uses, on the one hand, and higher levels of
aid ownership and transparence, on the other hand. The poor
in the recipient countries ought to be better oﬀ as a conse-
quence of those improvements of governance and the more
rational use of their scarce human capital resources. For86donor countries, the main shortcoming of aid coordination
is the loss of national sovereignty and the impeded ability to
pursue national objectives through aid programs. For recipi-
ent countries, it is their diminished independence owing to
reduced competition among donors.
Given the variety of eﬀects likely to result from aid coordi-
nation schemes and the serious obstacles in the way of their
realization, which add to their uncertainty, eﬀorts to quantify
the beneﬁts of such schemes are extremely perilous (see the
contribution of Bigsten in this issue for a recent attempt to
assess the beneﬁts of aid coordination among European coun-
tries). Our purpose in this paper is rather to clarify some of the
arguments in support of aid coordination in the light of the
unavoidable trade-oﬀs born of the existence of political costs.
Our discussion is anchored in the available literature but also
proceeds by delving into the implementation problems. In par-
ticular, it sets about highlighting (1) the diﬃculty of carrying
out punishment against lapsing recipient governments, and
(2) the impact of heterogeneity of donor countries on the
eﬀectiveness of aid coordination.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
review the scant economic literature that touches on the issue
of aid coordination on a theoretical level, either directly or
indirectly. In Section 3, we analyze the issue of aid coordina-
tion as a n-player coordination game in which multiple equi-
libria exist. We also highlight the trade-oﬀ between the
poverty reduction motive and the political sovereignty of
donors and lay the grounds for an analysis in those terms.
In Section 4, we examine the case of homogenous donor coun-
tries assuming that their number is pre-determined and they
are free to choose the intensity of their coordination eﬀorts.
In Section 5, we turn to the more interesting case of heteroge-
neous countries and attention is focused on the role of their
size and preferences, and the manner in which these factors
aﬀect the feasibility and eﬀectiveness of aid coordination
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selected by the Committee for Development Aid of the OECD
as pilot country to initiate a review of aid eﬀectiveness in 1996.
This case study material brings into light a number of hurdles
against eﬀective aid coordination that were not addressed in
the preceding analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper.2. AID COORDINATION AS A MECHANISM OF
INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT
In the following, we start by reviewing two theoretical
papers which directly address the problem of aid coordination
by assuming the existence of multiple donors. Thereafter, we
look at a number of papers which use a single donor frame-
work to analyze aid delivery but conclude that aid must be
coordinated to align incentives in the recipient countries with
those of the donor.
(a) Theories based on a multiple-donor framework
To begin with, Knack and Rahman (2004) examine how
alignment of incentives is aﬀected by the presence of multiple
donors that independently provide aid to a poor country.
Their contribution, focuses on staﬀ recruitment by donors in
the recipient countries. Each donor is assumed to maximize
the poverty reducing impact of its own projects, and project
success is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with the
amount of skilled local staﬀ time dedicated to the project.
The authors compare the optimal level of administrator time
devoted to each project when maximization takes place indi-
vidually with the optimal level when donors seek to jointly
maximize the poverty reduction impact of their projects. The
central result is that the number of administrators to be hired
declines when the concern of a particular donor for the success
of the projects of other donors increases. Lack of coordination
thus leads to excessive donor recruitment of administrators,
thus causing unnecessary stress on the demand for scarce
(staﬀ) resources in the recipient countries.
Torsvik (2005) considers a group of rich countries that inde-
pendently provide aid to a poor country, and how incentive
alignment is aﬀected by the presence of multiple donors aimed
at poverty reduction. Since there are several donors, poverty
alleviation in the poor country becomes a public good: if one
donor provides aid, it has a positive eﬀect on the welfare of
all the other donors. As is typical in such situations, non-coop-
eration between the donors leads to an undersupply of aid.
Cooperation or coordination between donors is therefore
desirable to bring total aid amount closer to its social optimum.
The next question addressed by Torsvik is how foreign aid
aﬀects policy in the recipient country. If the donors can use
enforceable conditional aid contracts to inﬂuence the recipi-
ent’s policy, they are always better oﬀ with coordination than
without it. When the donor–recipient relationship is not con-
tractible, however, the recipient government has an incentive
to exploit the poverty aversion of the donors to its own advan-
tage, by reducing domestic transfers to the poor when aid for
the poor is externally provided (the crowding-out problem).
Torsvik investigates this question by examining two diﬀerent
interaction regimes. First, if the donors are able to commit not
to increase their aid in response to crowding out by the recipi-
ent government, then all of them make simultaneous moves in
a non-cooperative game-theoretic setup. Donor cooperation
has then the eﬀect of increasing foreign support but also
encouraging crowding-out. The incomes of the poor increase
when donors coordinate their eﬀorts and provide more aidthan before, but it is not obvious that the utility of the donors
increases as well. 2 In order that donor coordination proves
beneﬁcial from the donors’ viewpoint, the government of the
recipient country must have enough aversion to poverty to
limit the crowding-out problem.
Alternatively, because of their strong aversion to poverty,
donors may be unable to commit not to help the poor in
response to crowding-out (“Samaritan dilemma”). Knowing
that, the recipient country reduces the support for its own
poor, ex-ante, in order to trigger more aid. In such a setup
(donors act as Stackelberg-followers), donor coordination
would again lead to increased aid ﬂows, but not necessarily
to more crowding-out. This is because, as a response to a fall
in the support of the recipient country to its poor, they would
increase total aid to a lesser extent when they cooperate that
when each donor acts independently. Recipient governments
are thus more eﬀectively disciplined through donor coordina-
tion when the donors are unable to commit not to help the
poor, that is, when they hold a weak bargaining power.
To sum up, when the recipient country’s government shares
the goals of the donors (it is equally averse to poverty), aid
coordination is unambiguously beneﬁcial. In the opposite case
of diverging interests, however, coordination is not necessarily
beneﬁcial if contracts cannot be eﬀectively used to align the
interests of the recipient country with those of the donors,
and if the latter do not face a Samaritan dilemma. According
to intuition, when the recipient government is in a position to
exploit the donors’ generosity, its ability to do so is more eﬀec-
tively controlled through donors’ coordination if the donors
make their decisions regarding the amount of aid after it has
itself decided how much of it will be transferred to the poor.
(b) Theories based on a single-donor framework
Let us now turn our attention to theoretical works that use a
single-donor framework to study aid eﬀectiveness. A useful
point of departure is the pioneer contribution of Azam and
Laﬀont (2003) who use a principal-agent framework to deter-
mine the optimal aid contract. This contract speciﬁes that the
recipient government will receive an aid amount (which is
endogenous) linearly dependent on the level of consumption
of the poor that it provides.
Azam and Laﬀont put emphasis on the adverse selection
problem: recipient countries vary in terms of the quality of
their governance, and the donor ignores these quality levels
when deciding about aid ﬂows. Their prescription is that the
donor should avoid giving aid to the worst-governed countries
as this would deprive its own citizen without the poor in the
recipient country getting much of it. To improve the situation,
the authors propose that the donor community relies on a spe-
cialized international agency that would collect information
about governance levels. Donor coordination, in this instance,
would increase the neglect of the poor in the worst-governed
countries.
Svensson (2000) and Svensson (2003) explicitly looks at con-
ditionality as a way to mitigate the moral hazard problem of
opportunistic recipients. He analyzes a two-stage game among
two recipient countries and the donor. The optimal aid con-
tract speciﬁes the amount of aid disbursed as a function of
the good or bad state of nature that prevails and reform eﬀort
helping the poor. Yet, as reform eﬀort is assumed to be non-
observable and non-contractible, the second-best contract is
such that it induces the recipient to exert higher eﬀort through
aid ﬂows being lower in bad states and higher in good states
(more likely to occur when reform eﬀort has been higher)
(p. 70).
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time-inconsistency problem on the side of the donor: ex post,
the donor is tempted to increase disbursements to the country
most in need. Anticipation that this will happen in turn lowers
the recipient’s incentive to carry out politically costly reform
policies ex ante (2000, p. 70). A mechanism that may possibly
mitigate the donor’s commitment problem is to delegate aid
management to an external agency with low poverty aversion,
so as to avoid the time inconsistency caused by the donor’s
sensitivity to poverty. This delegation clearly is an act of aid
coordination.
Gaspart and Platteau (2003, 2010) use a one-donor-one–
recipient framework to probe into the conditionality mechanism
considered as a means of disciplining opportunistic local elites.
They posit a costly fraud detection function (the leader’s deci-
sion is imperfectly observable) and a punishment mechanism
(the leader and community are deprived of subsequent aid
tranches if the former is caught). Yet, in all these papers,
and through diﬀerent channels, competition among donors
causes the external discipline exerted on the leader to be low-
ered at the expense of the intended beneﬁciaries.
Donors competition may thus yield perverse eﬀects, as ana-
lyzed in Platteau (2003). What is at work in the present case is
a mechanism, labeled by Avner Greif (1994) “Bilateral Repu-
tation Mechanism” (BRM) in analyzing relationships between
traders. If caught embezzling funds, the local elite are pun-
ished only by the aid agency or the donor that has actually
provided the funds embezzled. Because of competition among
donors, they are indeed ready to shift to another agency and
start cheating again. Alternatively, the presence of other
donors puts a ceiling on the severity of the aid delivery pack-
age that a given agency may propose so as to reach more eﬀec-
tively the poor in the recipient country, as in Bourguignon and
Platteau (2013).There are apparently two ways whereby this
“elite capture” problem can be mitigated. Reducing competi-
tion through concentration of aid supply in the hands of fewer
agencies or donors is the ﬁrst way but would be diﬃcult to
impose in what is essentially a free entry activity. The second
solution consists of a coordination mechanism whereby donor
agencies would mutually inform each other about fraudulent
acts committed by intermediaries or local leaders. 3 If this
Multilateral Reputation Mechanism (MRM) (Greif, 1994) is
apparently more feasible than attempts to reduce competition,
it is not devoid of serious practical diﬃculties that we highlight
in the next subsection.
(c) Information centralization as a mechanism of donor
coordination
Applied to our problem, the MRM would work as fol-
lows. Operating within a repeated-game framework, a donor
agency would adopt the strategy whereby it grants money to
a country or area, but only provided that it is not known to
have cheated another agency some time in the past. If
money is thus disbursed and the beneﬁting country is later
found to have cheated the agency, the latter dutifully
reports the fraud and communicates the name of the fraud-
ulent country to the other members of the donor commu-
nity. Before embezzling funds, a country’s elite or
government would thus be incited to think twice because
by cheating today it would spoil its reputation for future
interactions with the whole donor community. The MRM
is an equilibrium strategy. That is, if a government expects
every donor agency to adopt such a strategy, its interest is
to transfer the aid fund to the intended project beneﬁciaries.
Knowing that reaction, the interest of all donor agencies isto cling to the MRM. Honest behavior therefore gets estab-
lished as a (Nash) equilibrium.
There are several problems with the MRM, however. 4 The
ﬁrst one stems from the fact that the information conditions
that must be fulﬁlled for it to work are extremely stringent:
information must circulate perfectly between donor agencies.
This is hard to obtain when donors are numerous and
heterogeneous in terms of several key characteristics (size,
preferences, methods, time horizon, etc.).
Is the establishment of a private third party charged with
centralizing information (as suggested by Milgrom, North, &
Weingast, 1990) the solution to the problem caused by the
costliness of generating and communicating information?
Such a system can eﬀectively work only if donors have an
incentive to detect fraud and report fraudulent experiences
to the third party. However, in so far as the detection and
reporting of a fraud once it has occurred entails costs but
brings no beneﬁts to the individual agency which has been
cheated, such an incentive does not exist.
In order to create adequate incentives, the third party
should be able to exercise pressure on the detected fraudulent
leader so as to make it return the stolen money to the original
donor. As a result, so the theory goes, the threat against
potential recipients would be eﬀective and, if caught, a fraud-
ulent government would be prompted to comply with the third
party by returning the money stolen (so that its name is
removed from the black list). This said, honesty will be estab-
lished as a (symmetric sequential) equilibrium under the above
mechanism only if a number of conditions are met, in partic-
ular, the cost of the various steps in the whole procedure
(information query, appeal to the third party, recovery of
the stolen money) is not too high. Unfortunately, some of
these assumptions are likely to be violated so that the mecha-
nism is not self-enforcing.
A second problem lies in the fact that local elites or govern-
ments may not be actually concerned with preserving their
reputation because their time horizon is short and they could
be quite happy with running away with the money stolen from
one single project.
Finally, one key actor has been missing from the foregoing
discussion, namely the ultimate purveyors of funds from whom
donor agencies obtain their ﬁnancial resources. They are tax-
payers for national and international organizations, or the gen-
eral public mobilized in fund-raising campaigns for NGOs. A
serious dysfunctioning of theMRMarises if donors expect their
ultimate sponsors to react negatively to news of embezzlement
in their projects. A donor organization may have no incentive
to report the acts of malfeasance detected in its projects if it
believes that other agencies will refrain from revealing their
own bad experiences. That the above risk is real is evident from
the atmosphere of secrecy that surrounds the activities of many
donor organizations, including NGOs. To reduce such a risk,
there is no other way than improving the general public’s under-
standing of aid delivery processes and the possibility of failures,
so that honest donors which openly admit of cases of cheating
are not unfairly sanctioned to the beneﬁt of more opportunistic
ones.
Central funding bureaucracies (such as the European
Union) could possibly surmount several of the above prob-
lems through coordination. In particular, they could establish
a rating of donor agencies based on criteria that avoid reward-
ing success while punishing failure since such criteria encour-
age the under-reporting of failures (Edwards & Hulme,
1996, p. 189). Self-reported cases of fraud detection could thus
be considered as indirect evidence of the eﬀectiveness of mon-
itoring activities rather than as signs of failure. 5
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more pressing as, side by side with serious agencies, there exist
careless organizations that are not equipped with proper mon-
itoring and sanctioning mechanisms. They tend to disburse
funds quickly either because they do not have a good under-
standing of the game, or are not single-mindedly pursuing
the objective of poverty alleviation. The second problem arises
when, in spite of all their pro-poor rhetoric, aid organizations
are concerned with reproducing themselves as job- and
income-providers for their employees. In the same way that
“bad money chases good money”, the operation of these
opportunistic aid agencies risks driving “good” agencies out
of business or, else, it will force them to relax or altogether
give up their gradual and conditional disbursement proce-
dures.3. PARTICIPATION IN AN AID-COORDINATING
SCHEME: A BROAD FRAMEWORK
In this section, we pursue two diﬀerent objectives. First, we
represent the issue of aid coordination as a n-player (pure)
coordination game, which allows us to characterize the multi-
ple equilibria that are associated with it. Second, we lay the
grounds for the model to be expounded in the next section
by highlighting a trade-oﬀ between poverty reduction (the
altruistic aim of the donors) and political sovereignty.
(a) The conditionality mechanism as a coordination game
The reason why aid coordination may have positive eﬀects
on the level of governance becomes clear as soon as one real-
izes that aid governance can be conceived as a public good. If
a country is alone in setting conditions aimed at improving
governance in a recipient country, the beneﬁt from condition-
ality is likely to be small because of the recipient country being
able to turn to other, more lenient donor countries. The con-
ditionality-imposing country will therefore forsake its strategy
or weaken its conditionality. To overcome that obstacle, there
must obviously be a suﬃciently large group of donor countries
willing to engage in the governance-improving process, thus
lending it a collective character.
In fact, the conditionality mechanism resembles an n-player
pure coordination game in the sense that there exists a critical
threshold of players beyond which it becomes individually
proﬁtable for each participating player to bear the cost of col-
lective action or contribution to the public good. All that is
needed is that the individual beneﬁt increases with the number
of contributors: if the cost of individual contribution is con-
stant, there will necessarily be a critical number of contribu-
tors such that the individual beneﬁt starts exceeding the
individual cost of participating.
Precisely the same point can be made in regard of ownership
and transparency, two critical dimensions of the Paris agenda.
It can, indeed, be argued that, without donor coordination,
there is a great temptation for the recipient country to tailorFigure 1. Payoﬀ of contributing or nodevelopment objectives and to present results according to
the perceived preferences of each individual donor so as to
extract maximum rents. In front of a suﬃciently large group
of donor countries, on the other hand, the recipient country
is better disciplined into pursuing ambitious priorities, adopt-
ing adequate strategies, and being more transparent on results.
Let us now illustrate the above argument with the help of a
simple framework. Assume that there are N players and imple-
menting aid coordination (the public good) costs each player
c, but yields individual beneﬁts to each member of the group
equal to bðmÞ, where m stands for the number of voluntary
contributors. Adopting a continuous framework and logically
assuming that dbðmÞ=dm ¼ b0ðmÞ > 0, a player will participate
as long as the number of voluntary contributors is such that:
b0ðmÞ > c, as shown, in a discrete setup, in Figure 1. 6We then
examine two cases.
First, there are increasing returns to scale in coordination
beneﬁts over the whole range of possible participants:
b00ðmÞ > 0. We further and crucially assume that b0ð1Þ < c,
implying that, if no other country imposes conditionality, a
particular country will never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do it alone.
Finally, we assume that cooperating always provides a net
beneﬁt when N  1 players participate, b0ðN  1Þ > c. Under
these conditions, there exists a critical number of countries,
m, such that b0ðmÞ > c for mP m. Once a certain number
of other players agree to contribute to aid coordination, a par-
ticular country has an incentive to follow suit since the cost of
its individual contribution is less than its marginal individual
beneﬁt. In other words, as long as at least m other players
contribute, a particular country prefers to join the collective
eﬀort to free riding and none of the cooperating countries
has an incentive to stop doing so.
In such a game, there are two possible (Nash) equilibria (in
pure strategies): no coordination takes place or every country
agrees to join the coordination scheme. We are in an Assur-
ance Game: if a particular country expects that no other coun-
try will join the aid coordinating eﬀort, it will not contribute
either, yet if it expects that a suﬃciently large number of other
countries are ready to contribute, it will also contribute, and
this corresponds to the eﬃcient outcome.
The problem is slightly more complex if we assume that
increasing returns to scale in the provision of coordination ben-
eﬁts are succeeded by decreasing returns, so that b00ðmÞ < 0
beyond some value of m. Thus, the additional beneﬁt of partic-
ipation in the coordinating group when there already arem par-
ticipants, b0ðmÞ, increases and then decreases, such as is
illustrated in Figure 2. 7 An upper threshold, m, is now added
to the lower threshold, m. Below m, and above m, the indi-
vidual marginal beneﬁt of participation falls short of the cost c.
The two possible (Nash) equilibria are now: m ¼ 0 and
m ¼ m: either no one contributes, or m potential partici-
pants do contribute. The ﬁrst outcome will be observed if coun-
tries expect that less than m other countries are going to
participate in the coordination eﬀort. The second, more favor-
able outcome happens if the expectation is that at leastm other
individuals or countries are going to join this collective eﬀort.t contributing to the public good.
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participant joins the coordinating scheme. But if N exceeds
m, the public good is only produced by a subgroup of indi-
viduals or countries. In that case, it is not even clear that
m is a Nash equilibrium since every participant will be
tempted to join the N  m free riders. Moreover, when
N > m, the outcome characterized by m coordinating
participants is socially ineﬃcient. 8
Our next step is to acknowledge that coordination is not
simply a binary variable (whether aid coordination takes place
or not) but a continuous variable that can take on diﬀerent
values depending on the number of participating countries
and the extent to which aid eﬀorts are coordinated by them.
Let us assume that all the member states of a pre-existing club,
say the European Union, have agreed on coordinating their
aid eﬀorts. There remains the question of how far they are
ready to go in the direction of aid coordination.(b) The trade-oﬀ between aid eﬀectiveness and political
independence
Intensiﬁcation of aid coordination eﬀorts is expected to (1)
reduce the transaction costs borne by each individual donor
country; (2) enhance aid eﬀectiveness in the sense of better
reaching the donor’s objectives in the recipient countries;
and (3) entail a political cost in the form of a loss of national
autonomy in dealing with particular aid recipient countries.
This cost may be of a diplomatic nature, as coordinating with
other donors means giving up strategic levers on the action of
recipient countries’ governments. It may also be political by
conveying the idea of a loss of political independence, or sov-
ereignty in the public opinion of the donor country. There is
thus a trade-oﬀ between aid coordination beneﬁts—cost-sav-
ing and governance eﬀects—and this political cost. How the
equilibrium level of coordination will be set depends on the
countries’ preferences regarding their political independence
and the weight they attach to poverty reduction in developing
countries. Such preferences can be represented by conven-
tional indiﬀerence curves, such as those shown in Figure 3,
where the extent of political independence is measured along
the horizontal axis while the amount of development aid eﬀec-
tively reaching the poor (labeled eﬀective aid) is measured
along the vertical axis.
The willingness to exchange political control against aid for
the poor diminishes sharply when a great measure of political
control has already been lost and, conversely, such willingness
is greatest when the country concerned still retains a lot of
political control. The equilibrium level of coordination will
be determined by the tangency between an indiﬀerence curve,
on the one hand, and a “possibility curve” (dotted line inFigure 2. Coordination equilibrium in the presence of two thesholds.Figure 3) showing the amount of eﬀective aid that can be
achieved for a given loss of political control, on the other
hand. The latter allows for the fact that, as aid is better coor-
dinated, (1) the net amount of aid available to the recipient
countries increases thanks to a reduction in transaction costs,
(2) a larger portion of the (net) aid amount reaches the poor
thanks to improved governance of the recipient country, but
(3) political control diminishes.
As pictured in Figure 3, donor countries can be expected to
have heterogeneous preferences. In particular, big and small
countries tend to incur diﬀerent costs when they raise their
coordination eﬀort. Big countries tend to assign much greater
weight to considerations of political sovereignty and control
than smaller ones, if only because they are more able to design
strategies that serve their own national interests. An indiﬀer-
ence curve for a small donor country (the dashed line) is rather
ﬂat over most of its range, indicating that, in order to increase
the amount of eﬀective aid, this country is ready to surrender
large measures of political independence. The situation is
exactly opposite for big countries which tend to exact a high
price, in terms of eﬀective aid, to agree to forego even small
amounts of political control and independence.
(c) Two remarks
Two remarks need to be made before turning our attention
to our model of aid coordination. First, cost-savings resulting
from donor coordination do not accrue only to donor coun-
tries but also beneﬁt recipient countries directly—e.g., less
pressure on high-level staﬀ as mentioned in Section 2. There-
fore, if donor countries internalize the latter in their cost–ben-
eﬁt calculus, aid coordination will appear more proﬁtable to
them. Yet, there are also disadvantages caused by intensiﬁed
aid coordination for the recipient country. In particular, a loss
of sovereignty or “ownership” is suﬀered as a result of the
more rigorous implementation of conditionalities by coordi-
nating donors. We nevertheless choose to ignore this aspect
on the ground that it does not necessarily serve the interests
of the poor who are the target of development aid.
Second, because of the emergence of new donor countries
(China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, etc.) or organizations (private
foundations), Western donor countries and Japan now hold
a diminishing part of the aid share in many developing coun-
tries. As a consequence, there are signiﬁcant additional bene-
ﬁts to be reaped from the enlarging of the space of
coordination through the inclusion of those new aid actors.
They ought not to be over-estimated, however. As a matter
of fact, the assumption of increasing returns is likely to be
over-optimistic as far as some big new actors in the “aid mar-
ket” are concerned. Instead of the Assurance Game, the game
with external aid donor agencies may resemble a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. This means that donor agencies may be better oﬀ
free riding on the coordination eﬀorts of other donors than
joining these eﬀorts to reduce transaction costs and improve
conditionality. It is thus a well-established fact that “many
African leaders have embraced the Chinese, especially when
oﬀered vast loans for infrastructure projects. By contrast,
the leaders say, Western governments these days oﬀer little
more than lectures on good governance” (The Economist,
2011). 9
It is true that the present set-up ignores the utility function
of the recipient country and does not delve into the incentive
aspects of aid coordination for recipient countries’ govern-
ments. Its governance-disciplining eﬀorts are rather crudely
summarized in a reduced-form function that speciﬁes elite cap-
ture as negatively related to the intensity of aid-coordinating
Figure 3. The trade-oﬀ between political independence and aid eﬀectiveness when aid eﬀorts can be coordinated: big versus small countries.
THE HARD CHALLENGE OF AID COORDINATION 91eﬀorts. Compared to Torsvik’s model summarized above,
these simpliﬁcations allow us to explore other aspects of the
aid coordination problem. In particular, the eﬀects of the pres-
ence of political costs of aid coordination and heterogeneity of
donor countries can be highlighted in a systematic manner.
Having thus sketched the broad setup of our theory, we are
now ready to present its details and main results, starting with
the simple case of identical donor countries (Section 4), and
then proceeding with the more realistic case of heterogeneous
countries (Section 5).4. THE CASE OF IDENTICAL DONOR COUNTRIES
We consider the case of a ﬁxed number, m, of identical
donor countries belonging to a pre-existing club (say, the
European Union) that have to choose the level or intensity
of their aid coordination eﬀort. We denote by ei the eﬀort
made by country i in coordinating aid in the club, e.g., collect-
ing and exchanging information with other members on the
eﬀectiveness of its aid projects, sticking to collective recom-
mendations, etc. We assume that 0 6 ei 6 a, so that the coor-
dination eﬀort of a particular country cannot exceed a certain
ﬁnite value, say because political independence goes to 0 when
ei ! a. The assumption that all donor countries are identical
means, in our context, that they have the same preference,
the same aid budget, and the same cost function. We deﬁne
T i as the aid budget of country i;Ci as its transaction cost of
delivering aid, Zi as the measure of its political independence
or sovereignty. Moreover, the share of the net aid budget,
T i  Ci accruing to the target group (the poor) in the recipient
country, denoted by a, is an increasing function of the overall
coordination eﬀort by donors (a0ðÞ > 0). Assuming that a
country’s utility function is a Cobb–Douglas, and taking the
aid budget, T i, as given, we are then able to write the maximiz-
ing problem of the donor country i as:
Max
ei
U i ¼ Abii Z1bii
whereAi ¼ a eiþ
X
j–i
ej
 !
T iC T i;eiþ
X
j–i
ej
 !" #
; Zi ¼ ZðeiÞThus, Ai represents the eﬀective transfer of donor i to the poor
in the recipient country.
As speciﬁed above, bi (identical for all countries) is the
parameter measuring the intensity of the preference of country
i for poverty reduction, which is the objective of aid. The
inverse, 1 bi, is therefore the weight attached to political sov-
ereignty or national power and prestige. The value of bi deter-
mines the shape of the indiﬀerence curves. The higher it is, the
ﬂatter is the indiﬀerence curve, as shown in Figure 3.
Coordination eﬀorts have two beneﬁcial eﬀects, reducing
transaction costs and improving the targeting of aid, and
one negative consequence, a loss of political sovereignty.
The targeting improvement and the political loss are taken
into account in the utility function above. The transaction
cost, C, of delivering aid for country i is speciﬁed as an increas-
ing function of the aid budget, T i, and a decreasing function of
the aggregate coordination eﬀorts of all donor countries,
E ¼ ei þ
P
j–i
ej. We thus have: C
1
i > 0; C
2
i < 0, with the upper-
script indicating the ﬁrst derivative of the cost function with
respect to either its ﬁrst or second argument. Finally, the loss
of political sovereignty suﬀered by country i as a result of aid
coordination depends only on its own individual coordination
eﬀort, ei implying that Z 0ðeiÞ < 0.
We look for a symmetrical Nash equilibrium of the game
played by the m donor countries. Hence country i considers
the coordination eﬀorts of the other countries as given while
it maximizes its utility, Ui. To solve this problem, it is conve-
nient to take the logarithmic form of the utility function:
Max
ei
LogUi ¼ biLog a ei þ
X
j–i
ej
 !
T i  C T i; ei þ
X
j–i
ej
 !" #( )
þ 1 bið ÞLogZiðeiÞ
Since coordination eﬀorts are identical for all countries at
equilibrium ðe1 ¼ e2 ¼ . . . ¼ eÞ, we can drop all lowerscripts
and write the solution as:
b
a0ðmeÞ
aðmeÞ 
C2ðT ;meÞ
T  CðT ;meÞ
 
¼ ð1 bÞ Z
0ðeÞ
ZðeÞ ð1Þ
92 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAt equilibrium, the marginal beneﬁt of coordination is equal
to the marginal cost, each being weighted by its corresponding
elasticity in the utility function. The two components of the
beneﬁt show up in the LHS, the gain in targeting the poor
and the reduction in the transaction per additional unit of
coordination eﬀort. The RHS features the marginal cost of
coordination in the form of a loss of political sovereignty.
To obtain unambiguous comparative-static results, we must
make a number of additional yet realistic assumptions about
the signs of second derivatives. They are as follows:
a00ð Þ < 0; C22ð Þ > 0; Z 00ð Þ < 0. In words, we assume that
there are decreasing marginal returns to the provision of aid
coordination in terms of both the quality of targeting and
transaction-cost savings, and that the marginal disutility of
losing political independence increases with coordination.
Under these conditions, it can easily be checked that, in accor-
dance with intuition:
de=db > 0; de=dm < 0
To see how the equilibrium coordination eﬀort depends on
the aid budget, an additional assumption is needed on the cost
function, namely that, at equilibrium:
@LogðT  CðT ;meÞÞ
@T
P 0;
@
@e
@LogðT  CðT ;meÞÞ
@T
 0 ð2Þ
The ﬁrst condition reasonably requires that, when the aid bud-
get increases by one unit, the cost increases by less than one
unit. If this were not the case, then the aid actually transferred
to the recipient country would diminish with the total budget.
The second assumption states that the proportional increase in
the net amount of aid—i.e., budget minus transaction cost—
due to an increase in the aid budget decreases when coordina-
tion is more intense. This assumption may be rewritten as:
C2ð1 C1Þ  C21ðT  CÞ  0
As the ﬁrst term on the LHS of that inequality is negative—
i.e., ð1 C1Þ is positive as implied by the ﬁrst inequality in
(2)—this condition is automatically satisﬁed if C21 ¼ 0, that
is to say if coordination reduces only the ﬁxed cost part of
the transaction cost. If coordination is assumed to reduce
the variable cost part too, then condition (2) requires C21
not to be too negative. 10
Under the preceding simple assumptions, it is easily shown
through diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (1) that the
coordination eﬀorts decline with the aid budget:
de=dT < 0
These various results are summarized in Proposition 1 below:
Proposition 1. Under reasonable assumptions, the incentive to
coordinate aid efforts increases (1) when a country has a
stronger preference for poverty reduction compared to consid-
erations of national sovereignty and prestige, (2) when the size
of the coordinating club of donor countries is smaller, and (3)
when the size of the individual aid budget is lower.
The intuition of these results is simple. First, when the
donor country attaches marginally more importance to its
altruistic objective of poverty reduction, it increases its level
of coordination eﬀort at equilibrium. And, conversely, if it
attaches marginally more importance to its political indepen-
dence and national interests. Second, the presence of one more
country in the aid-coordinating club induces other participat-
ing donor countries to decrease the level of their coordination
eﬀort. A donor country thus “exploits” the presence of anadditional member country to reduce its own political cost
of aid coordination. Third, a decrease in the budget that each
individual donor country dedicates to poverty reduction
prompts an intensiﬁcation of its coordination eﬀort. This is
because, under assumption (2), the fall in the cost of aid deliv-
ery obtained through more coordination represents a larger
share of the actual aid, ðT  CÞ, when the total budget, T, is
restricted—i.e., the second term on the LHS of (1) increases
with T. As the marginal gain of coordination is now higher,
the marginal cost must increase at equilibrium, which requires
an increase in the coordination eﬀort. Conversely, the coordi-
nation eﬀort falls when the aid budget increases.
To complete our analysis of the case of identical donor
countries, three remarks are in order. To begin with, the pre-
ceding proposition and equilibrium condition (1) hold only for
an interior solution, which imposes some restrictions on the
parameters b; T ; m, namely:
b
1 b 6
Z 0ðaÞ=ZðaÞ
a0ðmÞ=aðmÞ  C2ðT ;maÞ= T  CðT ;maÞ½ 
Less than maximum coordination eﬀort, a, will be chosen only
if the preference for eﬀective aid relative to political indepen-
dence is not too high and if the number of donors in the club
and/or the amount of aid is large enough.
The second remark makes a straightforward point: if inside
the club an authority (say, the European Commission) exists
that can choose the level of coordination and impose it on
all members, that level should correspond to its maximum
possible value. Indeed, the authority ought to neglect the polit-
ical costs of aid coordination and maximize the aggregate
amount of (European) aid reaching the poor, that is:
Max
e
W ¼ aðmeÞ mðT  CðT ;meÞ½ 
Since there is no cost of coordination internalized by the
authority, it will obviously choose the corner solution ~e ¼ a.
Our third remark draws attention to an interesting equiva-
lence result. Assume that the objective function of each donor
country in the club is that of a pure rather than an impure
altruist. In other words, each donor’s utility is positively inﬂu-
enced by the amount of aid that reaches the poor, whichever
the source the aid actually comes from (provided that aid
comes from within the club). The donor’s problem is then:
Max
ei
LogUi ¼ biLog a ei þ
X
j–i
ej
 !
mT  C T ; ei þ
X
j–i
ej
 !"(

X
j–i
C T ; ej þ
X
k–j
ek
 !#)
þ 1 bið ÞLogZiðeiÞ
The solution of this problem is given by exactly the same
equilibrium condition as that obtained with the impure altru-
istic country (see Eqn. (1)). This means that the level of indi-
vidual coordination eﬀorts is not aﬀected by whether donor
countries value the aid given to the poor by other member
countries. Note however that this behavioral equivalence
between pure and impure altruism is conditional on all donors
being identical.5. THE CASE OF HETEROGENEOUS DONOR
COUNTRIES
We assume that there are two types of countries, big and
small countries. The big countries (labeled type 1) have greater
aid budgets than the smaller ones (labeled type 2) and they
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T 1 > T 2, and b1 < b2. In accordance with what has been found
in Section 4, these assumptions imply that, were they allowed
to impose their own preferred choices, the big countries would
opt for a lower coordination level than the small countries.
The same outcome would be obtained if we assumed straight-
away that countries of type 1 have a weaker preference for
poverty reduction than those of type 2, and all countries are
of the same size (in terms of aid budget). What will actually
happen in a heterogeneous coalition will depend on the pre-
vailing decision mechanism. There are several possibilities
here.
The ﬁrst possibility hardly requires comments: if there exists
an authority able to impose the coordination level that best
meets the objective of aid, it will choose the maximum level,
a, so that targeting of the poor is achieved in the best possible
manner. This solution is obviously closer to the choice favored
by the small countries. It is not very realistic, however, to
assume that the club’s authority, if it exists, is able to enforce
a coordination level that ignores political costs. It may thus be
content with setting a level, e, that maximizes the aggregate
utility of the member countries. Assuming, for the sake of con-
venience, that there is an identical number of big and small
countries inside the club (m1 ¼ m2) allows us to write the
authority’s maximization problem simply as:
Max
e
W ¼ b1Log aðmeÞ T 1  CðT 1;meÞ½ f g þ ð1 b1ÞLogZðeÞ
þ b2Log aðmeÞ T 2  CðT 2;meÞ½ f g þ ð1 b2ÞLogZðeÞ;
where m ¼ m1 þ m2. The equilibrium condition is then:
mb1
a0 með Þ
a með Þ 
C2 T 1;með Þ
T 1  C T 1;með Þ
 
þ mb2
a0 með Þ
a með Þ 
C2 T 2;með Þ
T 2  C T 2;með Þ
 
¼  Z
0 eð Þ
Z eð Þ 2 b1  b2ð Þ ð3Þ
The second approach does not rely on the presence of a cen-
tralized authority: big and small countries bargain together in
order to arrive at a commonly agreed coordination level which
by deﬁnition has to be unique. Because big countries have lar-
ger aid budgets, it is rather natural to think that they wield
more power in the bargaining process so that the coordination
level ought to better reﬂect their preferences than those of the
small countries. For example, in the setup of two countries (or
two groups of countries), we can think of the problem as that
of solving the following Nash bargaining game in which bar-
gaining strength is assumed to be a function of the size of
aid budget:
Max
e
U 1  U 1ð ÞT 1 U 2  U 2ð ÞT 2 ; ð4Þ
where U 1 stands for the reservation utility of big countries and
U 2 stands for that of small countries (we can actually think of
the club as made of two countries only, one big and one
small). Before concluding that the interest of the big countries
will always be better reﬂected in the equilibrium level of coor-
dination, we must nevertheless check whether U 1 exceeds U 2.
The reservation utility of a big country, which provides its
threat point, can be conceived as the utility that it could
achieve if the negotiation with small countries collapsed and
big countries coordinated their aid eﬀorts among themselves,
without any externality between their aid programmes and
that of small donors. We reason analogously for the deﬁnitionof the reservation utility of a small country. We can then write
that:
LogU 1¼b1Log a m1e1
 
T 1CðT 1;m1e1Þ
  	þð1b1ÞLogZðe1Þ
LogU 2¼b2Log a m2e2
 
T 2CðT 2;m2e2Þ
  	þð1b2ÞLogZðe2Þ
We know that e1 < e

2 and b1 < b2. It follows thatð1 b2ÞLogZðe2Þ < ð1 b1ÞLogZðe1Þ. Regarding the ﬁrst term
in the above expressions, it is also evident that
b2Log a2½  > b1Log a1½ . Therefore, whatever the relative values
of the net amounts of aid, ðT i  CiÞ, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the reservation utility of the small countries
is higher than that of the big countries. If that is the case,
whether the small countries succeed in negotiating a coordina-
tion level closer to their own preferred level will depend upon
the magnitude of T 1 relative to T 2. Indeed, the diﬀerence
between T 1 and T 2 determines not only the magnitude of the
gap between T 1  C1 and T 2  C2 and hence the gap between
reservation utilities (for a given coordination eﬀort), but also
the respective bargaining strengths of the two types of donor
countries as indicated by Eqn. (4). We can therefore state
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When the club of aid-coordinating countries is
heterogeneous in the sense that it includes both big and small
countries, and when the agreed coordination level is the outcome
of a Nash bargaining process, this level may be closer to the level
preferred by either the small or the big donor countries. A key
role in determining the result is played by the relative sizes of the
aid budgets: the larger the aid budget of the big countries
compared to that of the small countries, the more likely the
former will be able to tilt the coordination effort level in the
direction of their preference.
A third possibility that we may want to consider is the fol-
lowing: the big countries are strong enough to impose their
own conception of coordination yet subject to the participa-
tion constraint of the small countries. Since by assumption
there is an equal number of big and small countries, the prob-
lem can be simply written as:
MaxLogeU 1 ¼ b1Log aðmeÞ T 1CðT 1;meÞ½ f gþ ð1 b1ÞLogZðeÞ
s:t: b2Log aðmeÞ T 2CðT 2;meÞ½ f gþð1b2ÞLogZðeÞP LogU 2
Three cases can then arise. In the ﬁrst case, the participation
constraint of the small country is not binding and the equilib-
rium coordination level, ~e, satisﬁes the equation below:
b1m
a0 m~eð Þ
a m~eð Þ 
C2 T 1;m~eð Þ
T 1  C T 1;m~eð Þ

 
¼ ð1 b1Þ
Z 0 ~eð Þ
Z ~eð Þ ð5Þ
In the second case, the small country’s participation con-
straint is binding and the solution, e^, solves the following
equation:
LogU 2 ¼ b2Log a me^ð Þ T 2  C T 2;me^ð Þ½ f g þ ð1 b2ÞLogZðe^Þ
This case is all the more likely to arise as the discrepancy
between the two stand-alone preferred coordination levels, e1
and e2, is large. If this gap is too wide, a third case can arise
because the solution e^may actually fail to satisfy the participa-
tion constraint of the big country itself. In this case, satisfying
the small country’s participation constraint may prove too
costly for the big countries in which case they would prefer
to form a coordination subgroup among themselves.
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small donor countries directly follows from our assumptions
and is reﬂected in the result ~e < e (see Appendix I for the
proof). In words, the level of coordination and, therefore,
the amount of aid reaching the poor are higher when coordi-
nation is chosen by a club’s authority maximizing the aggre-
gate welfare of the member countries than when it is chosen
by the big countries in an unconstrained manner. Further-
more, when they are allowed to impose their preferred coordi-
nation level, and this can again be done in an unconstrained
manner, the big countries unambiguously prefer that solution
to the stand-alone situation. Formally, we have that
U 1 ~eð Þ > U 1 e1
 
. This results from three eﬀects working in
the same direction. Joining hands with the small countries
has the eﬀect of raising m:e so that targeting is improved (a
rises) and transaction-costs are reduced (C1 falls). In addition,
the fall of e induced by the enlarged size of the aid-coordinat-
ing group (from m1 to 2m1) causes the political cost of coordi-
nation to decrease (Z falls).
To establish the above, we just need to show that
dðm  eÞ=dm > 0 despite the fact that de=dm < 0. This requires
that the elasticity ge;m ¼ de=dmð Þðm=eÞ be larger than 1. It is
proven in Appendix II that this is indeed the case. We can
therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. When the differences between b1 and b2, and
between T 1 and T 2 are not too large, so that the big donor
countries, if allowed to, can impose their preferred level of
coordination in an unconstrained manner, they will always be
better off following this way than standing alone. The resulting
coordination level, however, will be lower than if it were chosen
by a club’s authority maximizing the aggregate welfare of both
big and small countries. As a consequence, the amount of aid
reaching the poor in the aid recipient country will also be smaller
in the first than in the second situation.6. THE CASE STUDY OF MALI 11
Since Mali has been selected by the Committee for Develop-
ment Aid of the OECD as pilot country to initiate a review of
aid eﬀectiveness in 1996, several steps have been taken to
reform aid practices and to set up new local institutions. In
particular, various commissions, groups, and mechanisms
have been put into place to facilitate the exchange of informa-
tion and the coordination of aid eﬀorts both between donor
agencies and between them and the government of Mali. In
addition to the streamlining of conditionalities and project
specialization among donor agencies (with a leading donor
assigned to each aid sector), there was a real eﬀort by Euro-
pean donors to foster continuous dialog with the government
of Mali so that it could assume leadership in deﬁning develop-
ment objectives and strategies. Institutional or organizational
innovations also aimed at rationalizing aid delivery, follow-up
and evaluation procedures, at stabilizing aid ﬂows in a multi-
year perspective so as to allow more predictable budgetary
projections, and at improving budgetary procedures in the
host country to increase transparency and make planning
more eﬀective. The idea of joint programing became a central
plank in the new strategy to support the so-called Strategic
Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCRP)
for the years 2002–06, 2007–11, and 2012–17. Actual coordi-
nation rests on three distinct levels: the global, the sectoral,and the sub-sectoral levels, all of them involving diﬀerent
mechanisms and group meetings.
Evaluation of the experience to this date has been carried
out by a team of experts and reported in the “Rapport
Final—Evaluation nationale de la mise en uvre de la De´cla-
ration de Paris (phase 2)”, Ministe`re de l’Economie et des
Finances (MEF). Their observations as well as those resulting
from our own ﬁeld interviews during the month of July 2011
suggest a number of interesting lessons that are summarized
and discussed below.
There have been genuine eﬀorts to share information among
donors, particularly between countries of the European
Union, and between donors and the government of Mali. This
helped to increase trust between donors and the aid recipient
country. Coordination works relatively well at the sub-sector
level, particularly in the health and education sectors, and it
is especially eﬀective when it comes to sharing information
and diagnoses, and to discussing joint approaches to follow
up and evaluation. Also appreciated is the work of the Pool
Technique, a cell of technical support created by the donors
to help harmonize their aid eﬀorts and prepare their consulta-
tions with national authorities. The existence of this mecha-
nism causes a signiﬁcant reduction of transaction costs for
the donors as well as for the host government which can talk
with only one interlocutor acting on behalf of all the donors.
Yet, despite the numerous institutions and mechanisms cre-
ated toward fostering harmonization of aid eﬀorts, results
have been essentially disappointing. Central weaknesses are
the following:
– The indecisiveness and lack of leadership of the recipient
government have weakened the coordination
mechanisms
– Dispersion of roles and duplication of structures in
charge of the management of aid eﬀorts have remained
important.
– Some donor agencies have refused to align themselves on
the new mechanisms, and new donors have been particu-
larly reluctant to join the coordination eﬀorts, mainly
because their interventions are focused on projects.
– Donors remain unwilling to pool ﬁnancial resources with
a view to funding common initiatives.
– Donors, especially from big countries, remain strongly
reluctant to slim down parallel structures through which
they used to deal with local authorities (e.g., diplomatic
and political channels). Furthermore, because of deep-
rooted habits of autonomy on the part of national aid
agencies, the EU Code of Conduct on the Complemen-
tarity and Division of Labor is not easily put into prac-
tice. By refusing to forsake part of their national
prerogatives, these donors prevent the realization of pos-
sible savings in transaction costs.
Some of the above conclusions deserve further comments.
To start with, not all European countries appear to be on
the same wavelength regarding the approach to development
aid. This is in spite of the fact that they all support the Paris
Declaration process. Some countries (Denmark, Sweden,
and the Netherlands) tend to give preference to coordination
with non-European countries (such as Canada) which they
deem closer to their own aid philosophy. One major point of
division among European countries actually concerns the role
of the General Budget Support (GBS) strategy (with Ger-
many, France, and Belgium more supportive than the three
aforementioned countries), implying the existence of divergent
opinions regarding the usefulness of conditionality. It is inter-
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below the expectations of the government of Mali in terms of
both aid volume—12% of the whole EU aid budget in Mali—
and number of donors involved.
Second, the Delegation of the EU in Mali is relatively strict
when it comes to deciding on the suspension of aid for budget
support whenever the outcome indicators prove disappointing.
Variable tranches are then not disbursed till the indicators
improve or the government takes up measures toward that
end. Yet, not all donors feel comfortable with this approach
and some of them consider the EU’s policy too harsh. During
two consecutive years, the Delegation has thus suspended its
aid to Mali but was alone in doing it. Other donor agencies
disagreed with the indicators used by the Delegation to reach
its decision, or with their interpretation or measurement. A
more serious problem arises from the fact that disbursement
decisions depend on individual decisions made by donors. In
other words, the donors consult with each other to decide
whether the agreed-on indicators have been satisﬁed (a hard
process in itself), but the actual disbursement of the money
at stake is left to the appreciation of each donor. This lack
of coordination about the manner in which non-fulﬁllment
of conditions set by the donors is followed up at the level of
actual disbursement decisions is a serious obstacle to eﬀective
aid coordination.
Third, rationalization of donor missions to the ﬁeld has
barely begun and parallel units subsist. Thus, 60 such units
for the implementation of rural development projects have
been recorded for the year 2008, as against 65 in 2006. For
another thing, only 15% of the project/program interventions
for rural development were carried out under the aegis of joint
programs in 2009, a ﬁgure to be compared to the set objective
of 66% for 2010. In reality, there is no such thing as a joint
basket of donor interventions. Joint missions have not
increased either: most donor agencies continue to organize
their ﬁeld missions separately. In addition, few projects (only
22 of them in 2009, representing 20% of the total) have been
co-ﬁnanced by several donors (the proportion was 18% in
2008). Finally, 58% of the projects/programs of rural develop-
ment ﬁnanced by European agencies were keeping a parallel
management unit.
Fourth, some donors refuse to use national systems and pro-
cedures on the ground that they are not compatible with inter-
national norms and are unreliable and ineﬃcient. Thus, the
share of OECD donors’ aid that follows the national proce-
dures of budgetary implementation, ﬁnancial monitoring,
and control was only 30% in 2010. This is actually a regression
from the ﬁgure of 34% recorded for the years 2007–09. Where
the situation is clearly better is in matters of alignment of
donor aid on national objectives and priorities: 73% of OECD
public aid in 2007 were obeying national priorities (60% in
2005). Quality of national systems of budgetary planning,
ﬁnancial management, and market adjudication is a key aspect
conditioning donors’ alignment on them. In 2009, only 37% of
development aid allocated to the public sector were properly
adjudicated through open calls, as against 45% in 2005. In
contrast, 40% went through the national system of public
ﬁnance in 2009, as against 29% in 2005 and 34% in 2007: this
increase was essentially caused by the increase in the number
of donors practicing budget support.
A last aspect deserves to be emphasized. The involvement
of the government of Mali remains weak and its appropriation
of the Paris Declaration process is far from satisfactory.
The country still lacks a genuine national strategy towarddevelopment aid and the government seems unable to concep-
tualize its own view about national development priorities. It
tends to rely on the ideas, proposals, and prescriptions coming
from the donor agencies without setting them against a list of
objectives set by itself in consultation with the local popula-
tion. It is therefore not surprising that a deﬁnition of budget-
ary guidelines toward meeting objectives is altogether absent.
Participation of the private sector and the civil society is
entirely achieved through sector-level groups. Communication
of information between the government of Mali and the
donors is deﬁcient, and information management at the level
of the government itself is lacking in many respects. As a result
of these weaknesses and the persisting duplication of aid man-
agement structures, aid eﬀorts and outcomes remain hardly
transparent.7. CONCLUSIONS
Aid coordination is a very desirable objective, in particular
because it can reduce the costs of delivering and monitoring
aid (the transaction cost eﬀect) and improve the targeting of
the poor (the governance eﬀect). The latter eﬀect is achieved
through more eﬀective disciplining of the central or local gov-
ernments and agencies in the host countries. In practice, how-
ever, we observe too little of such aid coordination. This paper
has drawn attention to some of the most awkward problems
that plague attempts to coordinate or harmonize aid eﬀorts.
First, even when the problem of aid coordination is seen as
a “pure” coordination problem, coordination ought not to
be taken for granted. As a matter of fact, donor countries
may fail to coordinate because, in the absence of a centralized
decision-mechanism, they do not expect that other countries,
or enough other countries, will join the coordinating group.
Second, aid coordination involves incentive problems that
exhibit the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma rather than a
pure coordination game. Serious problems of free riding need
to be overcome.
Third, as attested by our case study of Mali, donor countries
may take political costs seriously into account when they
decide about the level or intensity of aid coordination eﬀorts
they want to apply. A trade-oﬀ is thereby created between
costs and beneﬁts of coordination and the equilibrium level
of coordination that donor countries want is far from optimal
from the standpoint of aid targeting and aid outreach. Absent
these political costs (and provided that ’pure’ coordination
problems are surmounted), greater coordination of aid eﬀorts
would lead to lower transaction costs (of delivering and mon-
itoring aid) and higher shares of the aid budgets reaching the
target groups.
As soon as political costs are acknowledged, an interesting
issue emerges in so far as all donor countries do not value
political costs in the same way. The question then arises as
to how a group of heterogeneous countries will choose a nec-
essarily unique level of aid coordination inside the club. Diﬀer-
ent scenarios are possible and some are more favorable than
others to aid eﬀectiveness through better coordination of
donors’ aid eﬀorts. Empirical research regarding the actual
processes of decision-making inside (potential) clubs of aid-
coordinating countries is still in its infancy, and one may hope
that in the near future our knowledge in this respect will
improve. Only then will we be able to better understand which
scenarios are more relevant and what consequences follow
from them.
96 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. Interestingly, eﬀective coordination of aid programs is a legal
obligation for the Union and its Member States. Article 210 of the
Lisbon treaty thus states: “In order to promote the complementarity and
eﬃciency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall
coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult
each other on their aid programs including in international organisations
and during international conferences.”
2. This is because their utility is negatively aﬀected by the fall in the
consumption of their own citizens, while the positive eﬀect of the increased
consumption of the poor in the recipient country, which is not optimal as a
result of the crowding-out problem, may be insuﬃcient to compensate the
negative eﬀect.3. For a discussion of alternative coordination mechanisms, such as
codes of conduct, ombudsmen, social auditing, and accreditations, see
Ebrahim (2003, pp. 819–824).4. We ignore the problem that, in order to counter the elite’ temptation
to embezzle funds, donors should in theory give them a ﬂow payment or
rent each period, and this ﬂow should be at least equal to the interest on
the one-oﬀ embezzlement of aid they could carry out.
5. Note that outcome measures, assuming that they are feasible, are not
ideal yardsticks inasmuch as they induce aid agencies to select commu-
nities or countries where outcomes can be more easily attained.
6. In a discrete framework, this condition would be written as:
bðmÞ–bðm 1Þ > c7. Note that for the problem not to be trivial, it is assumed in Figure 2
that b0ðmÞ goes through a maximum greater than c and falls below c for
large enough values of m.
8. The optimal number of contributors is the value m that maximizes
NbðmÞ–mc. The collectively rational outcome thus requires that the
collective marginal beneﬁt is equal to the marginal cost, that is,
Nb0ðmÞ ¼ c. This is to be compared to the individually rational (Nash)
outcome, m, which is by deﬁnition such that b0ðmÞ ¼ c. Bearing in
mind the assumption of decreasing returns, it is evident that m > m.
9. Yet, it would seem that “growing numbers of Africans are turning
against the saviors from the East,” in part because the Chinese too often
indulge in corrupt practices in collusion with local oﬃcials and inspectors
(Leader “Rumble in the jungle,” April 23–29, 2011).
10. To see that this condition is not unduly restrictive, consider the
following reasonable (bilinear) speciﬁcation of the transaction cost:
C ¼ ða cEÞ þ ðb bEÞT (with E < b=b), where Eð¼ meÞ in the symmet-
rical equilibrium. In that expression, the ﬁrst term stands for the ﬁxed
transaction cost whereas ðb bEÞ is the variable cost per unit of the total
aid budget. Thus, both the ﬁxed cost and the variable cost decline with E.
With that expression, it is easily established that condition (2) is always
satisﬁed within a reasonable range of T.
11. We want to express our gratitude to Anne-Caroline Burnet from
CRED, University of Namur, who has collaborated with us in conducting
the interviews in Mali, and to Herve´ Bougault, head of the local oﬃce of
the Agence Francaise de De´veloppement, who has organized many of the
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.APPENDIX I
The equilibrium condition (3), which maximizes the aggre-
gate welfare of big and small donor countries, can be written
thus:
b1B1 þ b2B2 ¼ 
Z 0 eð Þ
mZ eð Þ 2 b1  b2ð Þ
where Bi ¼ a
0 með Þ
a með Þ 
C2i T i;me
ð Þ
T i  Ci T i;með Þ
 
Because b1B1 < b2B2, the above equality implies the follow-
ing inequality:
 Z
0 eð Þ
mZ eð Þ 2 b1  b2ð Þ > 2b1B1
THE HARD CHALLENGE OF AID COORDINATION 97Let us now reason ex absurdo. If e were a solution for the
problem in which big countries impose, in an unconstrained
manner, their preferred level of coordination, it would satisfy
Eqn. (5) and we could infer that:
b1B1 ¼  1 b1ð Þ
Z 0 eð Þ
mZ eð Þ < 
1
2
Z 0 eð Þ
mZ eð Þ 2 b1  b2ð Þ;
which simpliﬁes thus:
1 b1 <
1
2
2 b1  b2ð Þ
This inequality implies that b1 > b1 þ b2ð Þ=2, which is
impossible since b1 < b2 by assumption. We conclude that ~e
must be diﬀerent from e. It must actually be the case that ~e
is smaller than e so as to raise the value of B1 and, therefore,
b1B1:
~e < e )
b1
a0 m~eð Þ
a m~eð Þ 
C2i T i;m~eð Þ
T i  Ci T i;m~eð Þ
 
> b1
a0 með Þ
a með Þ 
C2i T i;me
ð Þ
T i  Ci T i;með Þ
 APPENDIX II
Let us start from the stand-alone equilibrium condition for
the big countries, Eqn. (5), which we write thus:
K1 ¼ b1
a0 m1e1
 
a m1e1ð Þ
 C
2
1 T 1;m1e

1
 
T 1  C1 T 1;m1e1ð Þ
" #
þ 1 b1ð Þ
Z0 e1
 
Z e1ð Þ
¼ 0
We want to ﬁnd the expression for de1=dm1, where the var-
iation of m1 is construed as a variation in the size of the club of
aid-coordinating countries (actually enlarged to include the
small countries).
We ﬁnd that:
dK1
de1
¼ b1m1
a0ðÞa 00ðÞ  a0ðÞð Þ2
aðÞð Þ2
"
 T 1  C1ðÞð ÞC
22
1 ðÞ þ C21ðÞ
 2
T 1  C1ðÞð Þ2
#
þ 1 b1ð Þ
ZðÞZ 00ðÞ  Z 0ðÞð Þ2
ZðÞð Þ2
" #
< 0dK1
dm1
¼ b1e1
a0ðÞa00ðÞ  a0ðÞð Þ2
aðÞð Þ2
"
 T 1  C1ðÞð ÞC
22
1 ðÞ þ C21ðÞ
 2
T 1  C1ðÞð Þ2
#
< 0
We thus immediately obtain the required expression:
 dK1=dm1
dK1=de1
¼ de1
dm1
¼  e1b1X
m1b1X þ 1 b1ð Þ ZZ
00 Z 0ð Þ2
Z2
  ;
where X ¼ a
0a00  a0ð Þ2
a2
 T 1  C1ð ÞC
22
1 þ C21
 2
T 1  C1ð Þ2
" #
< 0
Note that since X < 0, the above expression implies that
de1=dm1 < 0. Dividing both the numerator and denominator
by m1b1X , we obtain the following, more elegant expression:
 de1
dm1
¼ e1=m1
1þ l ;
where l ¼ 1 b1
m1b1X

 
ZZ 00  Z 0ð Þ2
Z2
 !
> 0
The elasticity of e1 with respect to m1 writes therefore as:
ge1;m1 ¼
de1
dm1
m1
e1
¼  1
1þ l ;
which is higher than 1, or smaller than +1 in absolute value. It follows
that dðm1e1Þ=dm1 > 0. QEDScienceDirect
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